What we propose

To implement article 49 of the Constitution on the democratic nature of parties, something has been done in recent years, with the decree law n.149 of 28 December 2013, converted into the law n.13 of 21 February 2014, containing the "Abolition of direct public financing, provisions for the transparency and democratic nature of parties and regulation of voluntary contributions and indirect contributions in their favour".

The law certainly marks a step forward, but focuses mainly on the abolition of electoral refunds, clamored for by public opinion as a scalp for the growing anti-politics. But the real power of the parties is elsewhere, primarily in the power of appointment, which has not been regulated in the slightest. Then, as regards the obligations of internal democracy, law 13 stops too superficially, imposing merely formal constraints in terms of decision-making democracy.

More needs to be done:

our proposal is contained in one publication (here the text) and incorporates the European recommendations in this regard, in particular those of Group of States against Corruption (GREEK).

Some of our ideas have been accepted into one Law proposal (text here), but more needs to be done if we really want to reform parties and make them the premise of an anti-corruption policy based on prevention, as well as a functioning democracy.

The enactment of a law implementing art. 49 can also be an opportunity to encourage the renewal of the ruling class. Starting from the obvious parties' inability to self-amend, the legislator could provide, for example, that the maximum number of electoral mandates for the same person be fixed in the Statute of the parties: for example, no more than three mandates, even if not consecutive, of permanence in an elected office. This does not simply mean the renewal of the ruling class: there would also be positive effects on the so-called "moral issue" as the turnover, especially at the top level, would make the formation of clientele less likely.

THE disincentives, of course, will be fundamental: those parties that grant exceptions to the limit of mandates should be excluded from electoral reimbursements. This implies that control follows the law, to be delegated to autonomous bodies. If, then, the results of the control were periodically made public, on the web, another disincentive to non-compliance with the Statute would automatically be created: the loss of support among voters.