Ha studiato all’Università Bocconi e all’Università di Lovanio, dove ha conseguito il Master in Matematica e il Dottorato in Economia. E’ professore ordinario di Economia all’Università di Brescia e membro dell’ istituto nazionale belga di ricerca (FNRS). Ha insegnato in scuole di dottorato a Lovanio, Parigi, Milano e Roma. La sua ricerca verte principalmente sui modelli di mercati con informazione asimmetrica, con applicazioni al credito e alla finanza.

FORMAZIONE

1995 Dottorato Economia Université catholique de Louvain.

1992 Master Matematica Université catholique de Louvain.

1991 Master Economia Université catholique de Louvain.

1989 Lurea Discipline Economiche e Sociali Università “Luigi Bocconi”, Milano.

1984 Maturità Liceo Classico Liceo “Arnaldo”, Brescia.

INCARICHI ACCADEMICI

2005 – Professore ordinario, Università di Brescia (idoneità di prima fascia dal 13/07/2000),

Chercheur qualifié onoraire du FNRS, Belgique.

2005 –2007 Professeur invité, Universitè de Paris-Dauphine.

2001 – 2005 Chercheur qualifié du FNRS, Bekgique.

1998 – 2001 Professore associato, Università di Brescia.

1995 – 98 Ricercatore, Università di Brescia.

1995 – 96 Maitre de Conference invité, Université catholique de Louvain.

VISITE ACCADEMICHE (permanenza per più di una settimana)

1994 Tel Aviv University

1996 Yale University

1997 SITE, Stanford University, Tel Aviv Univeristy

1998 Université de Cergy – Pontoise, CORE

1999 Université de Cergy – Pontoise, CORE

2001 Brown University

2003.2004 IMF, Washington

2005 Rice University

2004-2007 Université Paris-Dauphine

2007 – 2009 CORE, Unibersitécatholique de Louvain

CORSI INSEGNATI

Economia Politica

Teoria dei Giochi

Economia Internazionale Avanzata

General Equilibrium Theory.

Economics of Imperfect Information.

ARTICOLI PUBBLICATI

1. A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information (with F. Forges),

Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 159 – 175, 1997.

2. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (with F.Forges),

Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 338 – 406, 1997.

3. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges),

Games and Economic Behavior, 25, 292 – 310, 1998.

4. Consumer theory and Axiomatics: a note on an early contribution by Luigi Amoroso

(with A. Guccione),

History of Political Economy, 31, 587 – 589, 1999.

5. Nash – Walras Equilibria of a Large Economy (with H. Polemarchakis),

Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences, 97, 5675 – 5678, 2000.

6. Rules transparency and political accountability (with M. Bordignon),

Journal of Public Economics, 80, 73 – 98, 2001.

7. A note on the incentive compatible core (with F. Forges),

Journal of Economic Theory, 98, 179 – 188, 2001.

8. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (with F.

Forges and A. Heifetz),

Economic Theory, 18 , 349-365, 2001.

9. Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: a survey (with F. Forges and R. Vohra),

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 1-41, 2002

10. Informational Smallness and Rational Expectations (with A. Heifetz),

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 197 – 218, 2002.

11. Information at Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis),

Economic Theory, 21, 573 –584, 2003.

12. Ferrara’s cost of reproduction doctrine (with A. Guccione and M. Guidi),

Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 26, 107 – 114, 2004.

13. Two-person bargaining with Verifiable Information (with G. de Clippel),

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 799 – 813, 2004.

14. Two remarks on the Inner Core (with G. de Clippel),

Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 143 – 154, 2005

15. .Markets and Contracts (with A. Bisin, J. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi and H. Polemarchakis),

Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcoming.

16. Production and Financial Policy under Asymmetric Information (with J. Drèze and M. Tirelli),

Economic Theory, 35, 217–231, 2007;

17. Credit Market Failures and Policies (with S. Modica),

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11, 363 – 382, 2009.

18. An Economic Theorists’ Reading of Simone Weil  (with A. Heifetz)

Economics and Philosophy, 24, 191 – 204, 2008.

19. Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets (with F. Forges)

Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 135 – 145, 2009.

CAPITOLI DI LIBRO

20. Knowledge at equilibrium (with H.Polemarchakis),

in Y. Shoam (ed) Rationality and Knowledge, Morgan-Kaufman, New-York, 211-228, 1996.

21. Three Books on Knowledge and Rationality,

Research in Economics, 51, 69 – 82, 1997.

22.Trade and Welfare (with T. Cordella and H. Polemarchakis),

in G. Chicchilnisky (ed) Markets, Information and Uncertainty, CUP, Cambridge, 322- 327, 1999.

23. Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian Gamess (with F. Forges) in d’Aspremont (ed) Social Organization and Mechanism Design, De Boek, Bruxelles, 1999.

WORKING PAPERS

1.Information at a Competitive Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis)

CORE DP 9583, 1995.

2. Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks (with A. Heifetz and H. Polemarchakis),

CORE DP 9946, 1999.

3. Aspirations Traps (with A. Heifetz),

WP 0609, Università di Brescia

4. Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multiperiod economy (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri)

CORE DP 2007/82, 2007.

5. Nash – Walras equilibria with private information on both sides (with M. Meier, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona and H. Polemarchakis, University of Warvick) revise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory.

PROGETTI DI RICERCA IN CORSO

Dynamic delegation (with T. Cordella, Wordl Bank, Washington).

The big auction (with M. Meier, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona)

Vitality (with A. Heifetz, Open University, Tel Aviv)

Dynamics in market games (with S. De Michelis, Università di Pavia)